Abstract-Special protection schemes (SPS) have been implemented by many utilities to maintain power system integrity. Successful operations of SPS depend on reliable sensors, actuators, controllers and data processing units involved. In the past, if performance analysis of SPS is conducted, only the reliability of processing and decision systems is considered assuming that the data needed for correct operations are always available. However, experiences have indicated that the performance of information and communication technologies (ICT) adopted plays an essential role of the SPS dependability. In this paper, by adopting a stochastic-flow network to model the effect of communication network and a fault tree technique to model the causes of failure on demand, we present reliability assessment results of a local SPS deployed in Taiwan power system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid has become more resilient and at the same time more vulnerable when moving from conventional power grid toward smart grid. The increasing vulnerability of electrical infrastructure necessitates the development of control schemes to ensure that the power system meets the requirements to uninterrupted supply of electricity to consumers. In a heavily loaded power system, failure in detecting deteriorated system conditions and taking proper actions to mitigate the problem could lead to costly consequences. SPS or remedial actions schemes (RAS) are considered as a short term solution when the protection is focused on the capability of power system supply rather than on specific equipment. Operated correctly, SPS can improve the system response following the critical contingencies.
SPS reliability assessment was discussed in [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Most of these literatures focused on the reliability assessment of decision making process. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), reliability block diagram, Monte Carlo simulations and Markov modeling were adopted to evaluate the probability of failure on demand (PFD) and spurious (nuisance) trip rate (STR).
Due to the increased complexity of the power infrastructure and its growing dependence on ICT, the requirement to meet a higher level of power system security has become a challenging issue [6] . To have a successful SPS operation, the data package must be sent to the decision controllers and actuator in time through communication channels. The data delivery time depends on the bandwidth and traffic of the communication lines. The data transmission will be delayed if the data communication devices are heavily occupied [4] . For SPS reliability analysis, it's important to include the sensors, decision controllers, actuators and the communication system in the assessment model.
In practical computer, traffic and communication systems, the usage of link capacity is not deterministic. It is probably more suitable to adopt stochastic approach rather than the deterministic approach to study a real communication system. The authors in [7] proposed a stochastic-flow network algorithm to evaluate the success rate of sending data from source to sink through the communication network within a given time.
Experiences have indicated that there is a strong interdependency between the power and ICT infrastructures. In this paper, considering the ICT reliability and by using FTA, the reliability assessment of a dual triple modular redundant (TMR) generator rejection scheme (GRS) deployed by Taiwan Power Company (TPC) to mitigate a local power system stability problem is presented. The SPS adopts an event based approach that uses a predefined look-up table to determine the actions. Each TMR system consists of three identical controllers that gather I/O data, performs two-out-of-three voting on data and conducts calculations to determine if an action is necessary.
II. INFORMATION FLOW OF SPS
An SPS can be divided into its basic components. The performance and interactions of these basic components can be merged into reliability models to determine the overall system availability [4] . The components in the information chain of ICT to support SPS shown in Fig. 1 are described in the followings [6] :
(a) Data acquisition subsystem: This subsystem provides the real-time data of the power network, such as power flow on certain lines, power generation station output and status of circuit breakers. After collecting these system data, the data acquisition system will deliver the information to the processing system by communication system. by the processing system. Among others, common measures used in SPS are generator rejection and load shedding. This subsystem involves the action controllers, such as remote terminal unit, circuit breakers and relays, etc.
Fig.1: Information chain of ICT to support SPS
With the development of microprocessors, the trend has been for digital systems to replace the analog ones. Digital communication plays an important role in the development of digital protection systems. This necessitates the inclusion of entire ICT infrastructure in SPS reliability assessment [10] .
III. THE ANALYSES METHODS
The procedure shown in Figure 2 is used to perform the reliability assessment. FMEA is first conducted to identify the failure modes of components and subsystems involved. A system can be analyzed one component at a time. It can also be hierarchically divided into subsystems and modules as required. After identifying the causes/events that lead to SPS failures, the analysis is separated into three parts:
(a) Component level: The failure rate of each device can be calculated based on the mean time to fail (MTTF) which is determined by using historical operation information of devices. (b) Communication reliability: Since the usage of the communication channel is stochastic, a probabilistic approach can be used to assess the reliability of the communication system. The link capacity changes continuously and data delivery depends on how much bandwidth is available. A stochastic-flow algorithm is used in this study to model communication reliability. (c) Protection scheme level: A fault tree is used to model the failure of the protection scheme operation. It is convenient to model the dual TMR system by FTA.
Fig.2 Reliability assessment of SPS operation
A. Fault tree analysis FTA widely used in the industries is a systematic and deductive process to derive and analyze potential failures and their potential effects on system reliability. FTA is a top-down approach to the identification of failure modes and is constructed by using fault tree symbols [8] [9] . Once the events that can cause the malfunction of the "top event" are identified, the event probabilities are inserted in the fault tree for the calculation of the top event probability. The procedure of FTA for SPS reliability assessment is as follows [3, 4] :
(1) Define an undesired top event. (2) Examine each possible event to determine whether it could cause the top event. (3) Determine the primary events that lead to the top event and the sub-events that cause each of the primary events. (4) Connect the set of events using proper Boolean logic gate and link these logic symbols. (6) Perform quantitative evaluation as described below.
The top event is defined as the event that SPS fail to operate. Cut-set correction technique is used to calculate probability of the overall fault tree. A cut-set is a combination of basic events that lead to the top event, that is, when the basic events in the cut set occur, it will result in the top event. The Boolean logic gates used in this study are "AND" and "OR" gates. The equations that give the probabilities of the output events of the gates and each device are as follows:
Basic event:
AND gate:
OR gate:
Average failure rate:
Where λ is the failure rate of a base event in the fault tree. ‫ݐ∆‬ is the time interval for the PFD calculation. m and N are the number of components (events). Q is the total discrete number of time steps. q represents the q-th time interval. ܲ ௩௧ ே ሺ‫ݐ‬ሻ is the probability of a basic event at time t.
The system PFD can be calculated based on the structure of fault tree. It can be calculated by using historical system performance data. To have a statistical significance, a system, subsystem, and components have to be used for sufficient long time and for a large number. The average probability of the system failing to a demand in a specified time interval is referred to as PFD ௩ . Sensitivity analysis can be performed to figure out the role of a device or subsystem playing in SPS operations. If the reliability of the system is not sufficient, SPS design review should be conducted.
B. Stochastic-flow Algorithm
Stochastic-flow algorithm is adopted to evaluate the communication system availability when link capacity is not deterministic. This algorithm has two main steps as follows:
(1) Generate all capacity vectors from start point to the terminal. (2) Evaluate the system reliability.
For a path Pj from starting point to the terminal in a stochastic-flow network model shown in Fig. 3 with probability distribution shown in TABLE I, the minimal capacity ‫ݒ‬ of path ܲ such that ݀ units of data can be sent through ܲ within T units of time is determined by [7] :
Where ݈ is the lead time of arc ܽ in path ܲ , and the lead time in this case is the nodal processing delay. If ‫ܯ‬ is the maximum capacity of all arc k in ܲ , nj is the number of the arc in ܲ , and ‫ݒ‬ ≤ ݉݅݊ ଵஸஸ ೕ ‫ܯ(‬ ), then the capacity vector of path ܲ , ܺ , can be obtained according to:
Otherwise, ܺ does not exist.
Where ܽ is a n arc and ܺ is the minimum capacity vector of ܲ . If ܺ exists, the system reliability is as follows:
Where m is the number of capacity vectors. If the condition shown in (7) is satisfied, it means that capacity vector X is able to send ݀ units of data through ܲ within T units of time since all arcs have transmission capacity that are larger than the individual arc minimum capacity in vector ܺ . The details of the stochastic-flow algorithm can be found in [7] . For the four paths shown in Fig. 3 , P1 = {a1, a4}, P2 = {a2, a3, a4}, P3 = {a2, a5}, P4 = {a2, a6, a7}, the arc data can be found in Table I . The system reliability which means the data can be received in time is calculated by the algorithm step by step. For estimating communication reliability for SPS, the communication media topology and the data of bandwidth are required.
The assumptions used in this study are as follows:
(1) Each node is perfectly reliable (2) The capacity of each arc is stochastic with a given probability distribution as shown in Table I . (3) The capacities of different arcs are statistically independent. (4) All data are sent through one minimal path.
In the studied SPS, the communication system can be divided into several sections. For instance, the sensor can be treated as a start point and the switch is the terminal in one section. For another section, the switch can be a start point and the RTU is the terminal. Reliability of communication sections in SPS can be evaluated by using above mentioned algorithm. Figure 4 shows the studied local transmission network. If both 345 kV lines from Dongshan to Shenmei were tripped, the Dongshan area may experience rotor-angle instability and equipment overload. The studied SPS monitors the system status and load flow of all four 345 kV lines, fault types, and breaker status of the Dongshan to Shenmei 345 kV lines.
IV. TPC DONGSHAN SPS
When an N-2 event occurs in the 345 kV lines, according to the SPS look-up table, a command will be sent to shed one generator at Heping generation station. The decision table considers the power flows of four 345 kV lines and the fault type. Mitigation actions are according to tables for peak load and offpeak conditions and determined based on the operation mode of hydro pumped storage stations. System is at peak load period when the hydro pumped storage station is in the generation mode. The system is considered at off-peak period when it is in pumping mode. Figure 5 shows the decision procedure of the SPS. A dual two-out-of-three scheme is used to activate the control action. Figure 6 shows the communication infrastructure and components involved in the Donshan SPS. The data are delivered to the switches by the E1 and Ethernet communication lines. The trip signal is sent to the RTU in Heping station if the action is necessary. Figures 7, 8, 9 , and 10 show the fault trees established for calculating the PFD of the studied SPS. The causes of failure on demand include input subsystem, decision process and output subsystem errors.
Fig.4 Donshan Power System
Each circle in the fault tree represents a basic event (component error). Table II shows the detail information of the communication lines used and data transmitted. Dedicated lines are used in the studied SPS, thus, the channel capacity is not shared with other systems. The probability that the current bandwidth equals to maximum bandwidth is close to one. Data generated from these distributions can be used in the stochasticflow algorithm to estimate the reliability of communication network used in the system. Figure 11 shows the topology of communication from the sensor to switches. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Study result show that the SPS designed must trip the Heping generator unit in ‫ݏ݉051‬ after an N-2 event occurs to avoid local network instability problem. Dual TMR takes ‫ݏ݉02‬ to make decision and the relay takes ‫ݏ݉01‬ to take action. The input data should be received within ‫ݏ݉08‬ and the output data should be receive within ‫ݏ݉04‬ after it is sent.
The following assumptions are used in the tests. The maximum bandwidth of Ethernet used is 100Mbps. The lead times of E1 and Ethernet are 16 ‫ݏߤ‬ and 5 ‫ݏߤ‬ respectively. The data rate from each sensor is 115.2 Kbit/s. The channel capacity is equal to the bandwidth. The outage rates of E1 and Ethernet are 10 minutes/year and 10 sec/year respectively. The data size for transmitting fault type information is 100KB. The maximum bandwidth of phone line is 512 kbps and the data size of trip signal is 1KB. Table III shows the calculated data communication failure rates, and per hour means the probability of communication failure in an hour. These results are used in the fault tree to determine the SPS reliability. Tables IV  and III , the average probability that the calculated SPS failure on demand probability over one year period is 0.0647, which means that SPS will fail to operate 6 times in 100 scenarios that it should trigger the control action. This value is higher than the probability evaluated without considering ICT reliability which is 0.0173. Figure 12 and Table V shows a comparison of the PFD with and without considering ICT reliability. In the communication error free case it is assumed that all the sensors and communication line are perfect, only decision process and implementation modules errors are considered in the reliability analysis. Figure 13 shows the differences in PFD changes in one year period (8760 hours). Sensitivity analysis can be conducted to understand the effects of ICT and essential components in the overall SPS reliability. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Due to the increased complexity of SPS infrastructure and its growing dependence on ICT, it is important to develop a more rigid approach for SPS reliability assessment. This paper presents a framework that includes ICT errors. The analytical approach is based on FTA and a stochastic-flow algorithm. Test results indicate that errors occur in the ICT infrastructure would result in SPS operation risk and the probability is nonnegligible. Based on the calculated PFD, informed SPS reliability enhancement can be studied to increase the dependability of the system.
